# Improving Incident Retrospectives

This post was originally published on learningfromincidents.io.

Photo by Jared Erondu on Unsplash

As a Site Reliability Engineer (SRE) at Indeed, I often participate in the retrospective process that follows an incident. Retrospectives---in use at Indeed since late 2015---are a meaningful part of our engineering culture. I have never questioned their importance, but recently I was struck by shortcomings I saw in some retrospectives. For example:

• A retrospective meeting might use only ~30% of the allotted time.
• What is discussed might be gleaned from reading the incident ticket and retrospective document instead of attending the meeting.
• Too much focus is devoted to the conditions that “triggered” the incident.
• Signals used for deciding to hold a retrospective tend to direct focus toward incidents with high impact or high visibility.
• Were participants actually learning anything new? It became apparent to me that we were not using every incident to realize our full potential to learn.

I decided to explore why so that we could improve our process.

## The typical retrospective

Retrospectives at Indeed are usually a one-hour discussion including up to several dozen participants. The meeting is open to anyone in the company, but usually participants have either been involved in the incident response or have a stake in the outcome.

1. Review the timeline.
2. Review the remediation items in the template.
3. Find owners for the remediation items.
4. Open the room for questions.

## Spotting opportunities for improvement

In Summer 2018 I visited one of our tech sites and was invited to several local retrospective meetings to discuss some recent incidents. As an SRE it wasn’t unusual for me (or members of my team) to be invited. I also had subject matter expertise in a technology related to the incidents.

The facilitators took about 5 minutes to review the timeline, spent 8-10 minutes reviewing the remediation items, and concluded with questions related to the specific technologies involved in the causal chain. I didn’t learn anything new. I could have gained the same information from reading the incident ticket and retrospective document. This was a rare opportunity when a unique and eager group of people gathered in a conference room ready to collaboratively investigate. Instead, we never achieved the full potential.

This result is not uniform across retrospectives. I’ve been present in retrospectives where the participants offered such rich detail that the conversation continued well beyond the one-hour time limit, culminating with a huddle outside of the conference room.

The facilitators for these particular retrospective meetings followed the process faithfully but had only utilized ~30% of the time. It was clear to me that the retrospective process itself needed improvement.

## Nurturing a safety culture

To understand potential changes, I first solicited viewpoints on why we conduct retrospectives at Indeed. Reasons I heard are likely familiar to most software organizations:

• Find out what caused the outage
• Measure the impact
• Ensure that the outage never happens again
• Create remediation items and assign owners

These goals also reflect Indeed’s strong sense of ownership. When someone’s service is involved in an incident, there’s a concern that we were closer to the edge of failure than we thought we were. Priorities temporarily change and people are more willing to critically examine process and design choices.

It’s important to use these opportunities to direct efforts toward a deeper analysis into our systems (both people and technical) and the assumptions that we’ve made about them. These approaches to a different safety culture at Indeed are still relatively new and are evolving toward widespread adoption.

### Recommendation: Decouple remediation from the retrospective process

One process change I recommend is around the creation of remediation items. The retrospective process is not necessary as a forcing function for driving accountability of finding and owning remediation items.

I consistently observe that the creation of remediation items occurs organically after Production is stabilized. Many fixes are obvious to teams in the hindsight following an incident.

I see value in decoupling these “after action” activities from the retrospective process for many reasons.

• The search for remediation items is often a tacit stopping point that halts further or deeper investigation.
• The accountability around owning remediation items should be tightly coupled to incident ownership.
• The retrospective process should be an optional activity. By making the retrospective process optional, teams that decide to engage in it are doing so because they see value in it rather than as an obligation or a checklist item.
• Participants are freed up to conduct a deeper investigation unencumbered by the search for remediation items and shallow explanations.

### Recommendation: Lighten up the retrospective template

Another useful change is with the retrospective template itself.

Using retrospective templates can be a lot like filling out forms. The focus is directed toward completion of an activity rather than free exposition. A blank document encourages a different kind of sharing. I have witnessed incidents where responders were so motivated to share their thoughts and descriptions that they produced rich and detailed analysis simply by starting with a blank document.

If every incident is shaped like a snowflake, it’s impossible to develop a template that is equipped to capture its unique characteristics. A template constrains detail and triggers explanations through close-ended questions. A blank canvas is open-ended. A template is yet another tacit stopping point that hinders deeper analysis. I recommend that we apply templates to incident analysis, but that we use blank documents for the retrospective process.

## Driving organizational change

I have learned a lot by working to drive change at Indeed as we’ve grown quickly. My efforts have benefitted from my tenure in the company, experience participating in hundreds of incidents, and connection to the literature. I have made headway but there is still a lot to do.

I attribute some of my progress so far to finding other advocates in the company and remembering to communicate.

Advocates are colleagues who align closely with my goals, acknowledge where we could be doing better, and share a vision of what could be. I had no trouble finding these advocates. They are colleagues who are willing to listen, have an open mind and have the patience to consider another perspective. I held numerous 1:1s with leaders and stakeholders across the organization. I found opportunities to bring these topics up during meetings. I gave tech talks and reached out to potential advocates whenever I visited one of our global Engineering offices.

### Over-communicate

As much as I might think that I was communicating what I was working on, it was never enough. I found I had to constantly over-communicate. As I over-communicated and leveraged multiple media, I may have sounded repetitive to anyone in close proximity to my words. But this was the only way to reach the far edges of the organization who might not have otherwise heard me. Not everybody has time to read every email or internal blog post.

Response to these changes has been largely positive. The focus during retrospectives is still anchored to the technological factors, when more attention could be paid to the human factors. I’m exploring different avenues for increasing the reach and effectiveness of these efforts. This includes working with our instructional design team to create a debrief facilitator program, communicating more often and more broadly, making more process changes, continuing to help teams produce and share high quality write-ups, and focusing on producing educational opportunities. At this point we’ve only scratched the surface and I’m looking forward to what we will accomplish.

Alex Elman is a founding member of the Site Reliability Engineering team at Indeed. He leads two teams: one that focuses on Resilience Engineering and one that supports the flagship Job Search product. For the past eight years Alex has been helping Indeed adopt reliability practices to cope with ever increasing complexity and scale. Follow Alex on Twitter @_pkill.

# Unthrottled: How a Valid Fix Becomes a Regression

This post is the second in a two-part series.

In a previous post, I outlined how we recognized a major throttling issue involving CFS-Cgroup bandwidth control. To uncover the problem, we created a reproducer and used git bisect to identify the causal commit. But that commit appeared completely valid, which added even more complications. In this post, I’ll explain how we uncovered the root of the throttling problem and how we solved it.

Photo by Jake Givens on Unsplash

## Scheduling on multiple CPUs with many threads

While accurate, the conceptual model in my prior post fails to fully capture the kernel scheduler’s complexity. If you’re not familiar with the scheduling process, reading the kernel documentation might lead you to believe the kernel tracks the amount of time used. Instead, it tracks the amount of time still available. Here’s how that works.

The kernel scheduler uses a global quota bucket located in cfs_bandwidth->quota. It allocates slices of this quota to each core (cfs_rq->runtime_remaining) on an as-needed basis. This slice amount defaults to 5ms, but you can tune it via the kernel.sched_cfs_bandwidth_slice_us sysctl tunable.

If all threads in a cgroup stop being runnable on a particular CPU, such as blocking on IO, the kernel returns all but 1ms of this slack quota to the global bucket. The kernel leaves 1ms behind, because this decreases global bucket lock contention for many high performance computing applications. At the end of the period, the scheduler expires any remaining core-local time slice and refills the global quota bucket.

That’s at least how it has worked since commit 512ac999 and v4.18 of the kernel.

To clarify, here’s an example of a multi-threaded daemon with two worker threads, each pinned to their own core. The top graph shows the cgroup’s global quota over time. This starts with 20ms of quota, which correlates to .2 CPU. The middle graph shows the quota assigned to per-CPU queues, and the bottom graph shows when the workers were actually running on their CPU.

 Time Action 10ms A request comes in for worker 1.  A slice of quota is transferred from the global quota to the per-CPU queue for CPU 1.   Worker 1 takes exactly 5ms to process and respond to the request. 17ms A request comes in for worker 2.  A slice of quota is transferred from the global quota to the per-CPU queue for CPU 2.

The chance that worker 1 takes precisely 5ms to respond to a request is incredibly unrealistic. What happens if the request requires some other amount of processing time?

 Time Action 30ms A request comes in for worker 1.  Worker 1 needs only 1ms to process the request, leaving 4ms remaining on the per-CPU bucket for CPU 1. Since there is time remaining on the per-CPU run queue, but there are no more runnable threads on CPU 1, a timer is set to return the slack quota back to the global bucket. This timer is set for 7ms after worker 1 stops running. 38ms The slack timer set on CPU 1 triggers and returns all but 1 ms of quota back to the global quota pool.   This leaves 1 ms of quota on CPU 1. 41ms Worker 2 receives a long request.  All the remaining time is transferred from the global bucket to CPU 2’s per-CPU bucket, and worker 2 uses all of it. 49ms Worker 2 on CPU 2 is now throttled without completing the request.   This occurs in spite of the fact that CPU 1 still has 1ms of quota.

While 1ms might not have much impact on a two-core machine, those milliseconds add up on high-core count machines. If we hit this behavior on an 88 core (n) machine, we could potentially strand 87 (n-1) milliseconds per period. That’s 87ms or 870 millicores or .87 CPU that could potentially be unusable. That’s how we hit low-quota usage with excessive throttling. Aha!

Back when 8- and 10-core machines were considered huge, this issue went largely unnoticed. Now that core count is all the rage, this problem has become much more apparent. This is why we noticed an increase in throttling for the same application when run on higher core count machines.

Note: If an application only has 100ms of quota (1 CPU), and the kernel uses 5ms slices, the application can only use 20 cores before running out of quota (100 ms / 5 ms slice = 20 slices). Any threads scheduled on the other 68 cores in an 88-core behemoth are then throttled and must wait for slack time to be returned to the global bucket before running.

## Resolving a long-standing bug

How is it, then, that a patch that fixed a clock-skew throttling problem resulted in all this other throttling? In part one of this series, we identified 512ac999 as the causal commit. When I returned to the patch and picked it apart, I noticed this.

-       if (cfs_rq->runtime_expires != cfs_b->runtime_expires) {
+       if (cfs_rq->expires_seq == cfs_b->expires_seq) {
/* extend local deadline, drift is bounded above by 2 ticks */
cfs_rq->runtime_expires += TICK_NSEC;
} else {
cfs_rq->runtime_remaining = 0;
}

The pre-patch code expired runtime if and only if the per-CPU expire time matched the global expire time (cfs_rq->runtime_expires != cfs_b->runtime_expires). By instrumenting the kernel, I proved that this condition was almost never the case on my nodes. Therefore, those 1 milliseconds never expired. The patch changed this logic from being clock time based to a period sequence count, resolving a long-standing bug in the kernel.

The original intention of that code was to expire any remaining CPU-local time at the end of the period. Commit 512ac999 actually fixed this so the quota properly expired. This results in quota being strictly limited for each period.

When CFS-Cgroup bandwidth control was initially created, time-sharing on supercomputers was one of the key features. This strict enforcement worked well for those CPU-bound applications since they used all their quota in each period anyway, and none of it ever expired. For Java web applications with tons of tiny worker threads, this meant tons of quota expiring each period, 1ms at a time.

## The solution

Once we knew what was going on, we needed to fix the issue. We approached the problem in several different ways.

First, we tried implementing “rollover minutes” that banked expiring quota and made it usable in the next period. This created a thundering herd problem on the global bucket lock at the period boundary. Then, we tried to make quota expiration configurable separate from the period. This led to other issues where bursty applications could consume way more quota in some periods. We also tried returning all the slack quota when threads became unable to run, but this led to a ton of lock contention and some performance issues. Ben Segall, the author of the CFS scheduler, suggested tracking the core-local slack and reclaiming it only when needed. This solution had performance issues of its own on high-core count machines.

As it turns out, the solution was actually staring us right in the face the whole time. No one had noticed any issues with CFS CPU bandwidth constraints since 2014. Then, the expiration bug was fixed in commit 512ac999, and lots of people started reporting the throttling problem.

So, why not remove the expiration logic altogether? That’s the solution we ended up pushing back into the mainline kernel. Now, instead of being strictly limited to a quota amount of time per period, we still strictly enforce average CPU usage over a longer time window. Additionally, the amount that an application can burst is limited to 1ms for each CPU queue. You can read the whole conversation and see the five subsequent patch revisions on the Linux kernel mailing list archives.

These changes are now a part of the 5.4+ mainline kernels. They have been backported onto many available kernels:

• Linux-stable: 4.14.154+, 4.19.84+, 5.3.9+
• Ubuntu: 4.15.0-67+, 5.3.0-24+
• Redhat Enterprise Linux:
• RHEL 7: 3.10.0-1062.8.1.el7+
• RHEL 8: 4.18.0-147.2.1.el8_1+
• CoreOS: v4.19.84+

## The results

In the best-case scenario, this fix enables a .87 increase in usable CPU for each instance of our affected applications, or a corresponding decrease in required CPU quota. These benefits will unlock increased application density and decreased application response times across our clusters.

## How to mitigate the issue

Here’s what you can do to prevent CFS-Cgroup bandwidth control from creating a throttling issue on your systems:

• If you are using Kubernetes, use whole CPU quotas, as this decreases the number of schedulable CPUs available to the cgroup
• Increase quota where necessary

## Ongoing scheduler developments

Konstantin Khlebnikov of Yandex proposed patches to the Linux kernel mailing list to create a “burst bank.” These changes are feasible now that we have removed the expiration logic, as described above. These bursting patches could enable even tighter packing of applications with small quota limits. If you find this idea interesting, join us on the Linux kernel mailing list and show your support.

To read more about kernel scheduler bugs in Kubernetes, see these interesting GitHub issues:

# Unthrottled: Fixing CPU Limits in the Cloud

This post is the first in a two-part series.

This year, my teammates and I solved a CPU throttling issue that affects nearly every container orchestrator with hard limits, including Kubernetes, Docker, and Mesos. In doing so, we lowered worst-case response latency in one of Indeed’s applications from over two seconds to 30 milliseconds. In this two-part series, I’ll explain our journey to find the root cause and how we ultimately arrived at the solution.

Photo by twinsfisch on Unsplash

The issue began last year, shortly after the v4.18 release of the Linux kernel. We saw an increase in tail response times for our web applications, but when we looked at CPU usage, everything seemed fine. Upon further investigation, it was clear that the incidence of high response times directly correlated to periods of high CPU throttling. Something was off. Normal CPU usage and high throttling shouldn’t have been possible. We eventually found the culprit, but first we had to understand the mechanisms at work.

## Background: How container CPU constraints work

Almost all container orchestrators rely on the kernel control group (cgroup) mechanisms to manage resource constraints. When hard CPU limits are set in a container orchestrator, the kernel uses Completely Fair Scheduler (CFS) Cgroup bandwidth control to enforce those limits. The CFS-Cgroup bandwidth control mechanism manages CPU allocation using two settings: quota and period. When an application has used its allotted CPU quota for a given period, it gets throttled until the next period.

All CPU metrics for a cgroup are located in /sys/fs/cgroup/cpu,cpuacct/. Quota and period settings are in cpu.cfs_quota_us and cpu.cfs_period_us.

You can also view throttling metrics in cpu.stat. Inside cpu.stat you’ll find:

• nr_periods – number of periods that any thread in the cgroup was runnable
• nr_throttled – number of runnable periods in which the application used its entire quota and was throttled
• throttled_time – sum total amount of time individual threads within the cgroup were throttled

During our investigation into the response time regression, one engineer noticed that applications with slow response times saw excessive amounts of periods throttled (nr_throttled). We divided nr_throttled by nr_periods to find a crucial metric for identifying excessively throttled applications. We call this metric "throttled percentage." We didn’t like using throttled_time for this purpose because it can vary widely between applications depending on the extent of thread usage.

### A conceptual model of CPU constraints

To see how CPU constraints work, consider an example. A single-threaded application is running on a CPU with cgroup constraints. This application needs 200 milliseconds of processing time to complete a request. Unconstrained, its response graph would look something like this.

Now, say we assign a CPU limit of .4 CPU to the application. This means the application gets 40ms of run time for every 100ms period—even if the CPU has no other work to do. The 200ms request now takes 440ms to complete.

If we gather metrics at time 1000ms, statistics for our example are:

 Metric Value Reasoning nr_periods 5 From 440ms to 1000ms the application had nothing to do and as such was not runnable. nr_throttled 4 The application is not throttled in the fifth period because it is no longer runnable. throttled_time 240ms For every 100ms period, the application can only run for 40ms and is throttled for 60ms. It has been throttled for 4 periods, so 4 multiplied by 60 equals 240ms. throttled percentage 80% 4 nr_throttled divided by 5 nr_periods.

But that’s at the high-level, not real life. There are a couple of problems with this conceptual model. First, we live in a world of multi-core, multi-threaded applications. Second, if all this were completely true, our problematic application shouldn’t have hit throttling before exhausting its CPU quota.

## Reproducing the problem

We knew a succinct reproducing test case would help convince the kernel community that a problem actually existed and needed to be fixed. We tried a number of stress tests and Bash scripts, but struggled to reliably reproduce the behavior.

Our breakthrough came after we considered that many web applications use asynchronous worker threads. In that threading model, each worker is given a small task to accomplish. For example, these workers might handle IO or some other small amount of work. To reproduce this type of workload, we created a small reproducer in C called Fibtest. Instead of using unpredictable IO, we used a combination of the Fibonacci sequence and sleeps to mimic the behavior of these worker threads. We split these between fast threads and slow worker threads. The fast threads run through as many iterations of the Fibonacci sequence as possible. The slow threads complete 100 iterations and then sleep for 10ms.

To the scheduler, these slow threads act much like asynchronous worker threads, in that they do a small amount of work and then block. Remember, our goal was not to produce the most Fibonacci iterations. Instead, we wanted a test case that could reliably reproduce a high amount of throttling with simultaneous low CPU usage. By pinning these fast and slow threads each to their own CPU, we finally had a test case that could reproduce the CPU throttling behavior.

## The first throttling fix / regression

Our next step was to use Fibtest as the condition for running a git bisect on the kernel. Using this technique, we were able to quickly discover the commit that introduced the excessive throttling: 512ac999d275 “sched/fair: Fix bandwidth timer clock drift condition". This change was introduced in the 4.18 kernel. Testing a kernel after removing this commit fixed our issue of low CPU usage with high throttling. However, as we analyzed the commit and the related sources, the fix looked perfectly valid. And more confusingly, this commit was also introduced to fix inadvertent throttling.

The issue this commit fixed was exemplified by throttling that appeared to have no correlation with actual CPU usage. This was due to clock-skew between the cores that resulted in the kernel prematurely expiring the quota for a period.

Fortunately, this problem was much rarer, as most of our nodes were running kernels that already had the fix. One unlucky application ran into this problem, though. That application was mostly idle and allocated 4.1 CPUs. The resulting CPU usage and throttle percentage graphs looked like this.

CPU usage graph with 4 CPUs allocated and usage not exceeding .5 CPU

Graph of throttled percentage showing excessive throttling

Commit 512ac999d275 fixed the issue and was backported onto many of the Linux-stable trees. The commit was applied to most major distribution kernels, including RHEL, CentOS, and Ubuntu. As a result, some users have probably seen throttling improvements. However, many others are likely seeing the problem that initiated this investigation.

At this point in our journey, we found a major issue, created a reproducer, and identified the causal commit. This commit appeared completely correct but had some negative side-effects. In part two of this series, I’ll further explain the root cause, update the conceptual model to explain how CFS-Cgroup CPU constraints actually work, and describe the solution we eventually pushed into the kernel.